In North Korea everything revolves around Kim Il Sung’s Juche Thought. The country has “miracle rice” that will protect it from famine. Kim Jong Il is a budding reformer. Hawks and doves are battling it out in Pyongyang. North Korea has no nuclear program. The summit of 2000 has brought peace to the peninsula. North Korea has no uranium program. It has a nuclear program, yes, but no intention of weaponizing it. Kim Jong Un is a budding reformer. Hawks and doves are (again) battling it out in Pyongyang. Byungjin is a new slogan marking the end of the military-first policy. North Korea has attained to agricultural self-sufficiency. It has expressed a commitment to denuclearizing itself.
There was never as much evidence for the above assertions as existed for the relevant counter-assertions. Each resulted primarily from wishful thinking. Each had the potential to mislead the world into miscalculations. Each turned out to be wrong. Yet none of those responsible came in for the sort of widespread scolding and jeering that those who speculated about Kim Jong Un’s health were subjected to earlier this month.
It seems the term “fake news” can only be applied if an assertion is both wrong and inimical to North Korea’s interests. But Donald Trump appeared confident that Kim was alive and well, and clearly wanted him to be, so the danger of some air-strike or Bay-of-Pigs type idiocy seemed as remote as ever. I think that what really angered so many observers, particularly in South Korea, was the possibility that the rumors might undermine Kim Jong Un’s authority in the North.
I saw no profit in chewing over the gossip myself, let alone in commenting publicly on it, but I reject the notion that it was foolish or even malevolent of people not to accept the Moon administration’s assurances that Kim was fine. This “scandalization of the normal,” so characteristic of political communication in our times, seems to encounter less resistance here than anywhere else. Thae Yong-ho lost no time in begging for forgiveness – good practice for a new member of the opposition party.
What I don’t like about speculation centered on any individual North Korean is the way it distracts the world from what matters. As I have said many times: There is no evidence of significant ideological or policy-related disagreement inside the regime. Why, then, do people attribute so much importance to the question of who might take over in the event of the current leader’s death? Or to personnel changes in the published, outer-track hierarchy?
It makes far more sense to focus on the ideology that all North Koreans in the ruling elite appear to share. If 10% of the attention devoted to Kim Jong Un’s health went to the -ism in question, and I don’t mean leftism of any sort, we would be much better prepared for the year ahead.
UPDATE: 13 May 2020 17:20
In line with my perception of the functioning definition of “fake news” (see above) are the media guidelines published just two days ago (11 May) by professors at Kyungnam University under the English title: NORTH KOREA: FAKE NEWS (and How to Avoid It).
Prof. Woo Young Lee is summarized as describing “fake news” as that which
stresses the “abnormal” nature of North Korea and increases anti-North Korean feelings among South Koreans.
This bit from Professor Dong-Yub Kim strengthens my suspicion regarding the main reason for anger about the recent speculations:
Fake news about North Korea, which includes news about Kim Jong Un’s ill health or discussions on succession or an “unexpected event” in North Korea, potentially creates discontent in North Korea.
And we mustn’t have that.
The best part is the summary of Professor Eul-Chul Lim’s contribution on “The Desirable Role and Attitude of the Media and Experts”:
Members of the media and experts should conduct strict self-censorship, reflection, and take special countermeasures to prevent the spread of fake news regarding North Korea in the future.
The following steps are proposed as a way to guarantee that members of the media and experts ensure they adhere to desirable roles in reporting on North Korea.
-(Move Toward “Peace-oriented Journalism”)
There is a need to move away from journalism aimed at creating ungrounded distrust and hatred toward North Korea, along with conflict and division in South Korean society, that is based on the hope that South Korea will absorb North Korea or that North Korea’s government will collapse.
Media outlets that deal with North Korea-related issues should contribute to long-lasting peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.
-(Strengthen the Media’s Ability to Self-censor)
Given the lack of heavy punishment or other legal devices aimed at holding media outlets responsible for their reporting, there is a need for media companies to follow the “Journalism Code of Ethics.”
A South Korean in the know once told me that prosecutors here love interrogating academics, because they break under pressure fastest. I guess I shouldn’t be surprised to see professors over-conforming by leading the push for self-censorship and government-supportive speech. What I find more striking than the Tongil News-like tone of the Korean text — a tone that has been spreading here since 2017 — is the guilelessness and unguardedness with which the summary was translated into English. The authors seem genuinely unaware of the reaction it is likely to elicit from foreigners, even Moon-friendly ones.
