

(F3) A Table of 90 Examples of Source Fabrication, Plagiarism, and Text-Citation Disconnects in Charles K. Armstrong's *Tyranny of the Weak* (2013)

Introduction

The table below is a 90-item list of serious text-citation disconnects found in Charles K. Armstrong's *Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950-1992* (Cornell University Press, 2013). The majority of these disconnects are apparent cases of intentional deception. The table is focused on those cases that could be verified most accurately on the basis of the currently accessible archival sources. Efforts are in progress to check additional details.

Note that the table does not itemize mere errors of limited significance, such as wrong dates, names, and diplomatic titles (though a few such cases are mentioned in connection with bigger issues). Instead it consists of cases in which assertions made by the author in the text proper are not supported by the sources cited in the attendant footnotes. These sources range from Soviet, Chinese and German diplomatic archives to North Korean journalism to English-language secondary literature.

The majority of these disconnects can be broken down into the following two main types:

a) The use in the text proper of data apparently obtained from an uncited and plagiarized source, with a fabricated source cited in the attendant footnote. (PF - 55 cases)

b) The use in the text proper of data apparently obtained from an uncited and plagiarized source, with an irrelevant unrelated source cited in the attendant footnote. (PU - 22 cases)

In some additional cases, plagiarism occurred without source fabrication (P), unrelated sources were cited without plagiarism (U), the actual content of an otherwise valid and relevant source was seriously distorted by the author (D), or plagiarism occurred with source distortion (PD). Indeed, there are cases in *Tyranny* of eyewitness accounts having been altered in a way that the author modified the actual course of events, and arbitrarily changed known facts. In one such case, for example, the words of a Hungarian diplomat are placed in the mouth of his Soviet counterpart. In another one, the greater seriousness of which will be apparent to all scholars of diplomatic history, the North Korean security organs are said to have arrested a dissident inside the Bulgarian embassy, when in fact he was arrested outside. In a third case, the author cites a report supposedly written by the "GDR Embassy in the DPRK" on 22 December 1953, though the GDR did not open an embassy in North Korea until the summer of 1954.

The overwhelming majority of the uncorroborated textual assertions found thus far are fully or nearly identical with information published in my book, *Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-Korean Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964* (Stanford University Press, 2005). For instance, the content and date of the alleged East German report fully matches that of a report written by the Hungarian Legation in Pyongyang on 22 December 1953. The author of *Tyranny of the Weak* seems to have had access to this work as early as 2005, when it was still in manuscript form. A number of identical cases of source fabrication and plagiarism can be found in Charles Armstrong's published work over the past 11 years.

Nevertheless, I do not think that this problem is merely a plagiarism dispute between two authors, that is, between two individuals. After all, *Tyranny of the Weak* includes several uncorroborated textual assertions that are not linked to my publications in any way. Some of these cases involved the work of **Sergey Radchenko, Alexandre Mansourov, Kathryn Weathersby, Barry Gills, and Ruediger Frank**, while others distorted the content

of originally valid sources. Thus I am of the opinion that a far greater damage has been done to the academic community in general, and to Korean studies, Soviet studies, and Cold War studies in particular. When readers used and cited *Tyranny of the Weak*, they may have unknowingly and unintentionally reproduced many of the untruthful statements to be found in the book, unaware as they were of the unreliability of the cited sources. The scope of the problem may be gauged from the fact that this monograph has been a required reading at various U.S. and South Korean universities, including Columbia University. Readers who bought the book and who trusted the author's source citations were thus greatly misled. They deserve to be accurately informed which source citations can be relied upon, and which ones cannot be traced to verified sources.

In sum, these grave violations of academic ethics necessitate an official investigation.

Balázs Szalontai
Korea University, Sejong Campus, Department of North Korean Studies

TYPES of APPARENT DECEPTION

PF Plagiarism covered with Fabricated source (55 cases)

PU Plagiarism covered with source with Unrelated content (22 cases)

P Plagiarism not combined with other transgressions (2 case)

U Source with Unrelated content, no plagiarism (3 cases)

D Distortion: source content considerably different from claimed content (4 cases)

PD Plagiarism combined with distortion (4 cases)

ARCHIVES

AVPRF: Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation. Fond, Opis, Papka, and Delo are descending levels of folder organization.

CFMA: Archives of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Declassified Diplomatic Files

CMSEP: Collection of original Soviet documents published in South Korea and stored in electronic form in the National Library in Seoul [T'ongil munhwa yonkuso, Pyöngyang soryön taesakwan pimil söch'ol [Classified Materials of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang]. Seoul: K'oria k'ont'en'ench'u raep, 2002. Documents are referenced with a reference number in "KM xxxxxx" format.

KTS and KA: Hungarian National Archives

MfAA: Ministerium für Ausländische Angelegenheiten, or the East German foreign ministry, located in the Political Archive in Berlin

NKIDP: North Korean International Documentation Project is an online archive established by the Woodrow Wilson Center and accessible at <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/north-korea-international-documentation-project>

RGANI: Russian State Archive of Contemporary History

MfAA : Ministerium für Ausländische Angelegenheiten, or the East German foreign ministry, located in the Political Archive in Berlin

	Excerpt from <i>Tyranny</i>	Page/Footnote in <i>Tyranny</i>	Year of event	Source and type (month/day/year)	Source language	Issue raised	Link to Details
1 PD	"In May 1950, according to Soviet reports, Mao told the DPRK ambassador to Beijing, Yi Chu-yöng, that Korean unification was now possible only by military means, and there was no reason to be frightened of the United States. The Americans, Mao asserted, 'would not unleash a Third World War because of such a tiny piece of territory.' But if a conflict with the United States did come, China would be ready and would give 'sufficient assistance' to North Korea to defeat the imperialists."	Page 21 Footnote 44	1950	Archival Center for Korean Research Shtykov to Vishinsky 05/12/1950	Russian	The cited file makes no reference to any Chinese promise of assistance to North Korea against the U.S. The words "sufficient assistance" in fact appear in a very different context: Kim Il Sung "stated that he doesn't have more requests for Mao about assistance, since all his requests were satisfied in Moscow and the necessary and sufficient assistance was given him there." <i>Tyranny's</i> direct quotation of Mao's words shows perceptible textual similarities both with Alexandre Mansourov's dissertation ("Communist War Coalition Formation and the Origins of the Korean War") and with Kathryn Weathersby's translation of the cited document, neither of which is acknowledged. The information about a Chinese promise to assist North Korea can be found in Mansourov (320).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlUnlMzjdPvjQxcHMvIew?usp=sharing
2 PU	"Kim Il Sung led a delegation to Moscow in September 1953, primarily to settle the terms of Soviet assistance. The Soviet government agreed to cancel or postpone repayment for all of North Korea's outstanding debts and reiterated its promise to give the DPRK 1 billion rubles in outright aid, both monetary and in the form of industrial equipment and consumer goods."	Page 56 Footnote 19	1953	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 9 Papka 44 Delo 7 9/29/1953	Russian	The content of the cited source bears no relation to the text. (Note that Armstrong cited this document in the same context in a May 2005 article.) These two sentences in <i>Tyranny</i> contain content which Szalontai, citing a Hungarian diplomatic report and Suh Dae-Sook's <i>Kim Il Sung</i> , offers in his book (45-46).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlT1a2pQbVE0Ni1TRzgVjIew?usp=sharing
3 PF	"The Democratic Youth League (DYL), which had played a central role in political organization before the war, mobilized children and young people to rebuild schools and cultural facilities."	Page 59 Footnote 30	1953	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 9 Papka 44 Delo 9 9/29/1953	Russian	The cited source does not exist. Citing a Hungarian document, the date of which is identical with that of the non-existent Russian document, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (45).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlZ1BQ1mxzRUZ0bikVjIew?usp=sharing

4 PF	"In December 1953, the DPRK government canceled all pre-Korean War debts owed by the peasantry, a decree that was understandably well received by the hard-pressed Korean farmers."	Page 59 Footnote 31	1953	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 9 Papka 44 Delo 9 01/13/1954	Russian	The Russian document collection used by the author in <i>Tyranny</i> (P'yŏngyang soryŏn taesagwan pimil sŏch'ŏl, Seoul, 2002) contains no file matching this date and content. Nor does Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev's diary have an entry for 01/13/1954. Citing a Hungarian document dated 01/03/1954 [sic], Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (47).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIU3B3MlVaVGN5bjA/view?usp=sharing
5 PU	"North Korean officials told the East European advisers in Pyongyang that they wanted to establish new industrial centers in mountainous areas of the interior, where they would be close to the mines and also less vulnerable to attacks from enemy naval forces, which had caused so much damage during the Korean War."	Page 63 Footnote 47	1957	Archival MfAA A 6979 10/29/1957	German	The content of the cited source, which deals with Hungarian agriculture, bears no relation to the text. The information in <i>Tyranny</i> matches information in Szalontai's book (50).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIzMKVUTJQUUgXsUE/view?usp=sharing
6 U	"The chairman of the Pyongyang City Rehabilitation Committee (PCRC), established to oversee this urban reconstruction project, was none other than Premier Kim Il Sung himself, a native of the city. But reconstruction was carried out with the assistance, advice, and close supervision of Soviet technicians and Soviet ambassador Suzdalev."	Page 68 Footnote 63	1955	Archival "Interview with Pyongyang City Committee Vice-Chairman Comrade Kim Song-yong." AVPRF, Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 8 02/25/1955	Russian	The cited source mentions the reconstruction of Pyongyang only in passing. It does not mention Soviet technicians or Suzdalev. The actual source of this information is yet to be ascertained.	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIMk1NTkVReGIQU28/view?usp=sharing
7 PU	"Later, when the DPRK saw itself as a model for Third World development, it tried to assist several African countries in much the same way that East Germany and the Soviet Union had helped postwar North Korea — DPRK engineers, for example, rebuilt a large part of the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa during that country's Marxist phase in the late 1970s. It was in this broader sense of 'generalized reciprocity,' not tit-for-tat exchange, that the North Koreans seemed to understand their obligations to their European socialist benefactors, whereas the latter saw merely selfishness and ingratitude."	Page 76 Footnote 102	2003	Statement by Fred Carriere (Korea Society) at the Cold War International History Project Conference "Inside North Korea," Washington, DC, March 8, 2003	English	The CWIHP conference in question was held on 05/28/2002, not 03/08/2003. Presenters were Bernd Schaefer and Balázs Szalontai; discussants were Charles Armstrong, Nicholas Eberstadt, and Kathryn Weathersby. Fred Carriere was not present, and no statement akin to the cited one was made. Another relevant CWIHP conference, titled "North Korea's Crisis Behavior, Past and Present," was held on 05/01/2003. At this conference, Charles Armstrong, Fred Carriere, and Balázs Szalontai discussed the role of North Korea as aid recipient and aid donor. The statement about North Korean aid to African countries was made by Balázs Szalontai, not Fred Carriere, as the published record of the conference makes clear.	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlaFJLVNnVXpkvJQ/v?usp=sharing
8 PD	"Püschel modeled Kim Il Sung Street, the main thoroughfare of Hamhung, on East Berlin's Stalinallee, and planned Hamhung's central square along the lines of Alexanderplatz. A student of Wassily Kandinsky's at Bauhaus, Püschel argued that 'social order stands on the shape of a socialist city,' and planners should pay careful attention to traditional Korean city form and spatial relationships. Rather than modernity effacing tradition, 'tradition finds a new context in our society.'"	Page 77 Footnote 107	1958	Archival Bauhaus Archives, Dessau 22/58/15 Letter from Konrad Püschel 06/30/1958	German	Püschel's letter contains no statements of this sort. They appear to be mistranslations of statements that Alfred Förster wrote in a letter to a third party a week later. Both letters are excerpted in Rüdiger Frank's book, <i>Die DDR und Nordkorea</i> (1996), on the very same page (71), at the bottom of which only the footnoted citation for Püschel's letter appears. The footnote for Förster's letter is on the overleaf page (72), and thus easily overlooked.	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlbjV5V k9JX211Zlk/v?usp=sharing
9 PF	"In late February 1953, Pak himself was arrested, along with high-ranking southerners, including Central Committee secretary Yi Süng-yöp, former head of the Seoul People's Committee during the wartime occupation."	Page 80 Footnote 118	1953	Archival AVPRF 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 5 03/13/1953	Russian	The ROK-published Soviet document collection used by the author in <i>Tyranny</i> (P'yŏngyang soryŏn taesagwan pimil sŏch'ŏl, Seoul, 2002) contains no file matching this date and content. Nor do any files written by Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev and dated 03/13/1953 provide information about intra-party purges. Citing a Hungarian document dated 03/13/1953, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (37-38).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlBkIaQzFZV3N5QIk/v?usp=sharing

10 PF	"The purges spread through the government ministries and social organizations during the first months of 1953, as various alleged "hostile elements" and "factionalists" were exposed. Altogether some four hundred KWP members were expelled from the party."	Page 80 Footnote 119	1954	Archival AVPRF 0102 Opis 10 Papka 62 Delo 7 04/15/1954	Russian	The cited source does not exist. (An AVPRF document containing a conversation about these specific subjects is dated 12/28/1953.) Szalontai, citing a Hungarian report with the exact same date (04/15/1954), talks of the expulsion of 400 party members in his book (39-40).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTISldMOWpqbGxITnM/view?usp=sharing
11 PU	"Han began his attack at the First Congress of Writers and Artists, held on September 26-27, 1953. By this time Im Hwa had already been arrested and executed, and Han accused Yi T'ae-jun, another KAPF veteran, of having been a follower of Im.... Han also attacked Kim Sŭng-nam, the composer, accusing him of abandoning Korean musical traditions... Visual artists were similarly accused of neglecting Korean traditions and lacking patriotism."	Page 81 Footnote 125	1953	Secondary Yang & Chee "North Korean Education [sic] System" [Should be: Educational] 1963 p. 127-135	English	The content of the cited source (a study of North Korean education) does not mention the congress. Armstrong's content matches that of Szalontai's book (40-41), which is not cited here. Szalontai cites Hungarian material and Myers' <i>Han Sŏrya and North Korean Literature</i> . In the same paragraph, in regard to a different point, Szalontai also cites Yang & Chee, "North Korean Educational System," with the same page numbers cited in <i>Tyranny</i> .	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTla3k1NUg1ZmFZdEE/view?usp=sharing
12 PF	"At the Sixth Plenum of the KWP Central Committee in April 1954, Kim Il Sung criticized the unauthorized seizure of property of those whose relatives had fled to the South."	Page 82 Footnote 126	1953	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 5 04/19/1953	Russian	The Sixth Plenum actually took place in August 1953. The cited document therefore cannot and does not exist. Nor, it seems, is a typo to blame, as there is no relevant document in that Soviet collection dated 04/19/1954 either. Citing Hungarian documents, the first of which has the same date as the Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , Szalontai offers the relevant information about the Sixth Plenum in his book (42).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlQWVPVmdmYnNZMjg/view?usp=sharing
13 PF	"The Soviet-bloc diplomats found North Korea to be much less fraternal than the East Europeans were among themselves. The East German embassy noted that even the Soviet representatives had more difficulty carrying out their work in Pyongyang than in other People's Democracies."	Page 83 Footnote 127	1954	Archival MfAA A 5566 11/15/1954	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with that date can be found in the folder given. Citing a Hungarian document, whose date is identical with that of the apparently non-existent East German document, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (54-55).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIZDIYdGg2TjZ1Sxcviw/view?usp=sharing
14 P	"The Hungarian ambassador remarked that the North Koreans "would like to curtail the operation and activity of the whole diplomatic corps and keep its operation under a rather strict control."	Page 83 Footnote 128	1955	Archival Hungarian Embassy to DPRK "Annual Report" KTS 4.doboz, 5/a. 004076/1955 02/26/1955 CWIHP collection. Translated by Balázs Szalontai	English	<i>Tyranny</i> accurately reproduces the translation by Szalontai available in the NKIDP's digital archive and in the CWIHP Bulletin issue 14-15, p. 106. But in neither published version of the translation is the document referred to as "Annual Report," nor do the initials KTS appear in the bibliographical information provided. In his book (106), Szalontai quotes the same words that appear in <i>Tyranny</i> , while identifying the relevant source in the attendant endnote as an "Annual Report," and using his personal abbreviation KTS, meaning "Korea, Top Secret."	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIRldEZG5QOXIGZnM/view?usp=sharing
15 PF	"The DPRK frequently rotated the Korean employees of the East European embassies, a problem Soviet ambassador Suzdalev told his Hungarian counterpart there was little the East Europeans could do to address."	Page 83 Footnote 129	1954	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 10 Papka 44 Delo 9 09/29/1954	Russian	The cited source does not exist, and its date is incompatible with its content, because the conversation in question took place the following October. Szalontai, citing two Hungarian diplomatic reports, one of which is dated 09/29/1954, describes the conversation in his book (55).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIS1JvaGNiZmplMDA/view?usp=sharing
16 PF	"Unlike the Soviet-aligned People's Democracies, the North Koreans did not discuss internal party purges with other fraternal parties, except in the most minimal and oblique ways. East Europeans found themselves more isolated in Pyongyang than in hostile capitals of the West; the only similarly suspicious and closed fraternal country was Albania."	Page 83 Footnote 130	1953	Archival "GDR Embassy in DPRK, Report" MfAA A 5566 12/12/1953	German	The cited source does not exist. East Germany had no embassy in Pyongyang until summer 1954. Citing a Hungarian document, the date of which is identical with that of the non-existent East German document, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (55-57).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIS2JWVDM3ZDVYNFU/view?usp=sharing

17 PF	<p>"'Collective Leadership,' the slogan of the post-Stalin era, was not in the least appealing to Kim, although he did pay some lip service to the idea in the late 1950s, as we will see. While the leaders of Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and even Albania and Mongolia relinquished some of their multiple leadership posts, Kim did not follow suit, retaining the posts of premier and Central Committee chairman as his cult of personality continued to grow."</p>	Page 83 Footnote 131	1954	<p>Archival</p> <p>"GDR Foreign Ministry, Memorandum"</p> <p>MfAA A 5576</p> <p>January 1954</p>	German	<p>According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with that date can be found in the the folder given.</p> <p>Citing a Hungarian document, the uncharacteristically vague date of which, January 1954, is identical with that of the apparently non-existent East German document, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (58).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlNjIwN0NrVGVnRzg/view?usp=sharing</p>
18 PU	<p>"A few of the other party leaders questioned the autarkist and heavy-industry-oriented policies promoted by Kim, and this debate emerged as early as the Central Committee plenum of August 1953."</p>	Page 84 Footnote 132	1953	<p>Secondary</p> <p>Okonogi "North Korean Communism" 1994</p> <p>p. 181-183</p>	English	<p>The source makes no reference to any such questionings, disputes or debates at the August 1953 CC plenum.</p> <p>The information can, however, be found in Szalontai's book (60). Before referring to the plenum Szalontai cites Okonogi 181-183 for corroboration of a different point.</p> <p>Note the similarity to the Scalapino and Lee disconnect below.</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlDkRwTDdMaUFCMVU/view?usp=sharing</p>
	<p>"By September 1953, there were a thousand cooperatives in the DPRK."</p>	Page 84 Footnote 133		<p>p.184</p>		<p>Okonogi mentions cooperatives but gives no number for them.</p> <p>In his book Szalontai, citing a Hungarian archival source, estimates the number of cooperatives at between eight-hundred and a thousand (62-63).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlSGkxY2Z6RGMzeHM/view?usp=sharing</p>
19 PF	<p>"Local food shortages began to appear early in 1955; within a few months, much of the country was in the midst of a food crisis, and the traditional 'barley hill' (<i>pori kogae</i>) of spring famine loomed."</p>	Page 84 Footnote 134	1955	<p>Archival</p> <p>"GDR Embassy in DPRK, Report"</p> <p>MfAA A 5631</p> <p>05/27/1955</p>	German	<p>According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with that date can be found in the folder given.</p> <p>Citing Hungarian documents, one of which has a date identical with that of the apparently non-existent East German document, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (63).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlVdZuEk02em9PTkE/view?usp=sharing</p>
20 PF	<p>"First, the labor shortage caused by the war and the diversion of the workforce into industry hit hard the agricultural sector, which was still very labor-intensive in the mid-1950s despite glowing reports of mechanization. Indeed, much of the agricultural labor was carried out by women and young children, the adult males either lost or working in the cities."</p>	Page 84 Footnote 135	1955	<p>Archival</p> <p>"Soviet Embassy in DPRK, Report"</p> <p>AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 5</p> <p>05/10/1955</p>	Russian	<p>The ROK-published Soviet document collection used by the author in <i>Tyranny</i> (P'yongyang soryŏn taesagwan pimil söch'öl, Seoul, 2002) contains no file matching this date and content. Nor do the diaries of Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev or his successor Ivanov contain any entries dated to May 1955.</p> <p>Citing two Hungarian documents, one of which is dated 05/10/1955, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (63 and 65).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlDZuEk02em9PTkE/view?usp=sharing</p>
	<p>"The province hit hardest by the food shortage was North Hamgyŏng, the DPRK's most remote and mountainous area. This had long been the part of Korea where rural life was poorest and most precarious, and the site of greatest hunger once again in the famine of the 1990s. But the whole country was affected by the crisis. East European diplomats reported a large internal migration of North Koreans searching for food, and many instances of death by starvation. Peasants, even in the relatively affluent provinces of South P'yŏngan and Hwanghae, supplemented their diets with -- or tried to live entirely on -- wild grains, grasses, and tree bark."</p>	Page 85 Footnote 141					

21 PF	<p>"In April 1955, Soviet ambassador A. M. Petrov remarked to a group of East European diplomats that the KWP's report of 3 million metric tons of grain harvested in 1954 was certainly false. At best, Petrov said, the crop had been 2.3 million metric tons, and even that might be an exaggeration. As a result of these exaggerated production figures, the state often took 50 percent of local harvests as tax, rather than the 25 percent required by law, depleting peasants of what little reserve they might have had. Similarly, compulsory grain deliveries were based on higher production figures than were in fact the case, and the state had to take grains at times by force."</p>	<p>Page 84-85 Footnote 137</p>	1955	<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 65 Delo 45 04/13/1955</p>	Russian	<p>The three sources cited in <i>Tyranny</i> are likely to be the same Soviet document. Details similar to these excerpts can be found in Petrov's journal entry of 04/05/1955, but there he makes clear that he was the recipient, not transmitter, of this information, which was provided in conversation with a North Korean informant.</p> <p>A Soviet report of 04/13/1955 on a conversation with the same informant (which took place on 03/31/1955) contains an even more accurate version of the excerpted details. None of these sources mentions Petrov's conversation with Hungarian or other East European diplomats.</p> <p>Szalontai's book sources a report from the Hungarian Embassy, dated 04/13/1955, on a conversation between a Hungarian diplomat and Petrov on 04/12/1955. (64, 72, 108). This report contains all details provided in <i>Tyranny</i>.</p> <p>NOTE: Twice misidentified in <i>Tyranny</i> as the Soviet ambassador, A.M. Petrov was in fact a counselor at the Soviet Embassy.</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIV19QYnRfZzVTT3M/view?usp=sharing</p>
	<p>"In a discussion with Hungarian diplomats in April, Soviet ambassador Petrov railed against Kim Il Sung's one-man rule and cult of personality, which prevented mistakes from being openly admitted and addressed. Production targets were inflated to the point of absurdity, Petrov said; the grain crop target for 1955, for example, was originally 4 million metric tons, double the output in 1954 and completely impossible to attain."</p>	<p>Page 86 Footnote 147</p>		<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 5 04/13/1955</p>			
	<p>"Soviet counselor Petrov noted in April 1955 that there was 'strong dissent' among the peasantry, which could be exploited by 'hostile elements' opposed to the current regime."</p>	<p>Page 101 Footnote 30</p>		<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 7 04/13/1955</p>			
22 PU	<p>"Government attempts to address the problem only made it worse. For example, a decree of October 1954 prohibiting private trade in grain, combined with the state's decision to withhold rice from government shops in order to maintain ration levels, led inevitably to a shortage of rice in state shops and skyrocketing inflation. A kilogram of rice that had cost forty won in state-owned stores soon became four hundred won on the black market, equivalent to roughly one-third of the average worker's monthly income."</p>	<p>Page 85 Footnote 139</p>	1955	<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 8 02/24/1955</p>	Russian	<p>The cited source bears no relation to the text.</p> <p>Citing a Hungarian document, the date of which is identical with that of the non-existent Russian document, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (64-65).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTINm1oN0xLRXZhalU/view?usp=sharing</p>
23 PF	<p>"By the end of 1954, one-fifth of peasant households were in collective farms; two years later, the proportion had risen to 40 percent."</p>	<p>Page 85 Footnote 140</p>	1955	<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 65 Delo 45 02/26/1955</p>	Russian	<p>The cited source does not exist.</p> <p>The same AVPRF folder contains three other, differently dated reports, which contain similar information although with different statistics, but <i>Tyranny</i> does not cite them.</p> <p>Citing Hungarian sources, including one with the same date as <i>Tyranny</i>'s non-existent Soviet source, Szalontai imparts the relevant information about collective farms in his book (65).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTITINqT1EtDF9nNUE/vi ew?usp=sharing</p>
24 PF	<p>"Nevertheless, the DPRK leadership was forced to reexamine the policies that led to the disaster; among other steps, the regime put a stop to compulsory grain deliveries while distributing rice from China and the USSR to regions hit hardest by hunger."</p>	<p>Page 86 Footnote 143</p>	1955	<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 65 Delo 45 05/05/1955</p>	Russian	<p>The ROK-published Soviet document collection used by the author in <i>Tyranny</i> (P'yŏngyang soryŏn taesagwan pimil sŏch'ŏl, Seoul, 2002) contains no file dated 05/05/1955, nor does any file match this content. Nor do the diaries of Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev or his successor Ivanov contain any reports dated to May 1955.</p> <p>Referring to a Hungarian source dated 05/05/1955, Szalontai provides the relevant information in his book (67).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIZXNr eGZGMFN1NTg/view?usp=sharing</p>
25 PF	<p>"Nevertheless, the food situation continued to deteriorate after the April plenum. An April 26 editorial in the Rodong Sinmun mentioned the food crisis for the first time, suggesting that citizens supplement their diets with grass and tree bark. The issue was quickly withdrawn from circulation."</p>	<p>Page 86 Footnote 146</p>	1955	<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11</p>	Russian	<p>The document collection titled <i>P'yŏngyang soryŏn taesagwan pimil sŏch'ŏl</i> contains no file dated 05/26/1955, nor does any file match this content. Nor do the diaries of Soviet Ambassador Suzdalev or his successor Ivanov contain any reports dated to May 1955.</p> <p>Referring to a Hungarian source dated 05/26/1955, Szalontai provides the relevant information in his book (67).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTJSTyR3c/X01USTYtR3c/view?usp=sharing</p>

PF	"In particular, the issue of compulsory grain deliveries had diminished the reputation of the party in the eyes of the peasant population."	Page 101 Footnote 31		Papka 60 Delo 5/Delo 7 05/26/1955		05/26/1955. Szalontai provides the relevant information in his book (71 and 108). Note that both <i>Kim Il Sung's</i> Endnote 44 and <i>Tyranny's</i> Footnote 146 cites documents dated 05/10/1955 and 05/26/1955. The source dated 05/10/1955 is described in Case 20.	
26 PF	"Emergency grain shipments and agricultural goods from the USSR and China saved North Korea from an even worse food crisis than it already faced. Under Soviet pressure, the DPRK rescinded its prohibition on private trade in grains, and the price of rice declined as food sources increased. More resources were put into irrigation, and the production of chemical fertilizer was stepped up, improving agricultural production. Agricultural taxes were reduced, peasant debts were canceled, and small merchants were allowed to resume their business."	Page 87 Footnote 148		Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 5 08/unspecified/1955	Russian	In the relevant part of the Russian document collection titled <i>Pyongyang soryon taesakwan pimil söch'ol</i> , there is no file whose content matches the document cited by the author. Note that the day of the report is not specified. In the diary of Soviet Ambassador Ivanov, each report is accurately dated. Citing a Hungarian source, Szalontai provides the relevant information in his book (73-74). Note that the first Hungarian source cited in <i>Kim Il Sung's</i> Endnote 54 is a document dated August 1955, with the day unspecified by its diplomatic author.	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlNvP5Zlp0NzAyQWc/view?usp=sharing
27 PF/ PD	"In a conversation at the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang in July 1955, Soviet ambassador Ivanov informed his East European colleagues that the Soviets were well aware of North Korea's extreme sensitivity to any perceived interference in their internal affairs, and that therefore Soviet and other foreign advisors had to be wary of pushing too hard or appearing to scold or lecture the Koreans for their 'errors.'"	Page 87 Footnote 150		Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 5 08/17/1955	Russian	The Soviet source cited here contains no entry for 08/17/1955 for Soviet Ambassador Ivanov. Nor do other related Soviet documents contain these details. The remark about NK sensitivities was actually made by the Hungarian ambassador in his report on the conversation. Citing a Hungarian source with the exact same date as <i>Tyranny's</i> non-existent Soviet source, Szalontai provides the relevant information in his book (74-75).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlNvP5Zlp0NzAyQWc/view?usp=sharing
28 PU	"In September 1955, the Soviet Union gave North Korea full control of Sokav, the Soviet-Korean airline."	Page 88 Footnotes 152 and 153		Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 11 Papka 60 Delo 5 10/19/1955	Russian	In the cited Soviet source, Ambassador Ivanov does not refer to the airline. (In an earlier report, dated 08/30/1955, the ambassador consistently writes its name as SOKAO.) Citing a Hungarian source with the same date as the irrelevant Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , Szalontai spells the airline's name as Sokav and describes the agreement in question (76).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlEIDV1NwQ1BlcWc/view?usp=sharing
29 PF	"The campaign against 'factional elements' continued at the KWP Central Committee Plenum in December 2-3. There, the Kim loyalist Im Hae attacked Pak Il-u, one of the prominent 'Yanan' Koreans, and Kim Yöl, a Soviet Korean member of the Central Committee. Kim Yöl was expelled from the party and arrested."	Page 89 Footnote 158		Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 12 Papka 68 Delo 6 03/01/1956	Russian	The ROK-published Soviet document collection used in <i>Tyranny</i> (Pyongyang soryon taesagwan pimil söch'öl, Seoul, 2002) contains no file whose date and subject match that of the cited source. Szalontai, citing two Hungarian diplomatic reports dated to 03/01/1956, provides the relevant information in his book (77-78).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlQXRWSGd2UzR1T28/view?usp=sharing
30 PU	"This put Kim in good company, as Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh also missed the Congress. In March, Ch'oe reported his visit to the KWP Central Committee. Very little of Ch'oe's speech, or of the other speeches at the Central Committee session (including that by Kim Il Sung) was reported in the North Korean media."	Page 95 Footnote 3		Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 12 Papka 68 Delo 6 04/19/1956	Russian	The ROK-published Soviet document collection used in <i>Tyranny</i> (Pyongyang soryon taesagwan pimil söch'öl, Seoul, 2002) contains an entry dated 04/19/1956 but it deals with unrelated topics. Szalontai, citing a Hungarian diplomatic report dated to 04/19/1956, provides the relevant information in his book (86).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlQjByZUktY3JjcIE/view?usp=sharing
31 PU	"The KWP Congress did not discuss the problem of the cult of personality, nor did it pay much attention to shifting economic priorities from heavy industry to raising the standard of living for ordinary citizens, two major issues of the Twentieth CPSU Congress. Soviet ambassador Ivanov, in his discussions with other Soviet-bloc diplomats, complained of North Korea's reluctance to take up this latter issue and its insistence on a misguided heavy-industry-first approach to economic development, as well as the lack of attention paid by the DPRK leadership to economic cooperation between North Korea and the other fraternal countries."	Pages 95-96 Footnote 6		Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 12 Papka 68 Delo 6 06/04/1956	Russian	The cited source bears no relation to the content. Szalontai, citing a Hungarian diplomatic reports whose date is identical with that of the cited source, provides the relevant information in his book (87-88).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlVZgTHVrBuppWUk/view?usp=sharing

32 PF	"In a speech at the Third KWP Congress, Minister of Education Kim Ch'ang-man, also vice-chairman of the Central Committee and a long-time ally of Kim Il Sung, criticized the lack of Korean geography, history, and literature in North Korean university education."	Page 96 Footnote 9	1956	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 12 Papka 68 Delo 6 07/18/1956	Russian	The ROK-published Soviet document collection used in <i>Tyranny</i> (P'yŏngyang soryŏn taesagwan pimil sŏch'ŏl, Seoul, 2002) contains no diary entries or other Soviet Embassy reports dated to July 1956. Szalontai, citing a Hungarian diplomatic report dated to 07/18/1956, provides the relevant information in his book (89).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTILVNScHRQNHric0E/view?usp=sharing
33 PF	"In fact, the Soviets thought they already saw signs of reform in Kim's approach to economic policies, and they did not want to risk alienating a foreign leader who was both loyal to the Soviet Union and popular at home."	Page 97 Footnote 14	1956	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 12 Papka 68 Delo 6 09/12/1956	Russian	The ROK-published Soviet document collection used in <i>Tyranny</i> (P'yŏngyang soryŏn taesagwan pimil sŏch'ŏl, Seoul, 2002) contains no diary entries from Soviet Ambassador Ivanov dated to September 1956. Folders of the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) accessible in NKIDP contain an entry of Ivanov's dated to 09/12/1956, but it talks of an opera performance and other unrelated material. Szalontai, citing a Hungarian diplomatic report dated to 09/12/1956, provides the relevant information in his book (95).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTISIE0MVNzV21neVkl/view?usp=sharing
34 PF	"The attack on Kim Il Sung came at the KWP Central Committee plenum in the final days of August. One by one, Kim's opponents gave speeches criticizing various aspects of his rule. Pak Ch'ang-ok had a particularly lengthy document detailing the errors of Kim Il Sung's rule, which he was not allowed to read in its entirety."	Page 98 Footnote 15	1956	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 12 Papka 68 Delo 6 10/31/1956	Russian	The Russian document collection titled <i>P'yŏngyang soryŏn taesagwan pimil sŏch'ŏl</i> contains no Soviet Embassy documents dated to October 1956. Those folders of the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) that are accessible in NKIDP include the relevant section of Soviet Ambassador Ivanov's diary, but this section does not contain an entry for 10/31/1956. Szalontai, citing two Hungarian diplomatic reports, one of which is dated to 10/31/1956, provides the relevant information in his book (97-98).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlCXPoZjdMNFpVUGM/view?usp=sharing
	"Some of these criticisms were refuted by Kim at the Plenum. In the area of economic policy, for example, Kim referred to his experiences in Eastern Europe and the USSR and assured the committee he would continue the process of reform in Korea. The plenum did take up several issues of economic reform, including reducing the agricultural tax, slowing down the pace of collectivization, and paying more attention to ordinary living standards."	Page 98 Footnote 18					
35 PF	"The attack on Kim Il Sung came at the KWP Central Committee plenum in the final days of August. [...] the charges were harsh and numerous, covering three main areas. First, there was the question of the personality cult, which persisted in North Korea despite the call for eliminating such "deformities" of Marxism-Leninism after the Twentieth CPSU Congress. Second, there was the lack of attention to improving living standards. Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik alluded to the food shortages and lack of consumer goods, the direct results of the overemphasis on heavy industry."	Pages 98 Footnote 16	1956	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 12 Papka 68 Delo 6 06/10/1956	Russian	The ROK-published Soviet document collection used in <i>Tyranny</i> (P'yŏngyang soryŏn taesagwan pimil sŏch'ŏl, Seoul, 2002) contains no diary entries from Soviet Ambassador Ivanov dated to 06/10/1956. In any case, a file from June 1956 could not possibly contain the record of an event that took place later, in August 1956. Szalontai, citing three Hungarian diplomatic reports, one of which is dated to 06/10/1956, provides the relevant information in his book (52).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTINWdwcGhuTEFBUjg/view?usp=sharing
36 PU	"A small number of North Korean students in Hungary defected to the West at the time of the uprising, and most of those remaining were brought back to North Korea. The KWP Central Committee resolved in December to step up mandatory physical labor for students and intellectuals."	Page 100 Footnote 27	1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 8 Delo 7 05/14/1959	Russian	The cited archival location is incompatible with the system of folders. The document dated 14 May 1959 bears no relation to the text. Citing Hungarian reports, one of which has the same date as <i>Tyranny</i> 's cited source, Szalontai provides the relevant information (101-103).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIREZZNWRzTzI6V2M/view?usp=sharing
37 PF	"Fears of a spillover effect from the Hungarian uprising were not unfounded; even before the event, North Korean students in Hungary had attempted to defect to the West, and months after their recall to North Korea, a great many of the students who had been in Hungary were considered sympathetic to the 'counterrevolution.'"	Page 100 Footnote 29	1957	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 8 Delo 7 07/02/1957	Russian	The date of the cited document is incompatible with the specified archival location (which contains files dated 1959). There is no AVPRF document dated 07/02/1957 or 07/02/1959 that contains the information provided in <i>Tyranny</i> . Citing Hungarian reports, one of which has the same date as the non-existent AVPRF document, Szalontai provides the relevant information in Kim Il Sung (106).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTldn1VkZSSzVnZlkw?usp=sharing

38 PF	"There were other, unofficial channels of communication; students, for example, knew of the intervention of Peng and Mikoyan, and of course word spread among intellectual circles of the Hungarian unrest."	Page 101 Footnote 35	1956	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 12 Papka 68 Delo 6 10/05/1956	Russian	The cited source is Soviet Ambassador Ivanov's Pyongyang journal, which, however, contains no entry for 10/05/1956. (In an entry for 10/03/1956, Ivanov records the relevant conversation with his Hungarian counterpart Prath, but without offering this information.) Citing a Hungarian report with the same date as the non-existent Soviet journal entry, namely 10/05/1956, Szalontai provides in an endnote the relevant information from the conversation between the two ambassadors (293).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlX3hVSC11Q21UUFU/view?usp=sharing
39 PF	"In September 1959, Kim Il Sung declared that the Five-Year Plan should be fulfilled in less than three and a half years, and factories were asked to double their output over the 1958 level."	Page 103 Footnote 43	1958	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 14 Papka 75 Delo 6 10/07/1958	Russian	The cited AVPRF folder covers from December 1957 to mid-September 1958 and thus cannot contain the cited document dated 10/07/1958. The next folder contains a document with that same date, but this does not contain the information discussed. Although "1958" may well be a typo for "1959," the Soviet document for 10/07/1959 does not contain the information discussed either. Szalontai discusses this very information in his book (121-122), on the basis of Hungarian documents, one of which is dated 10/07/1959.	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlMng3NUtoUXh5TzQ/view?usp=sharing
40 PF	"Ch'ollima, like the Great Leap Forward, also promoted the decentralization of industry and local self-sufficiency. More than 40 percent of North Korea's consumer goods were reportedly produced locally by the fall of 1959, and every province had its own steel and cement works."	Page 104 Footnote 45	1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 7 09/15/1959	Russian	The cited source is Soviet Ambassador Puzanov's Pyongyang journal, which does not contain an entry for 09/15/1959, because he was in Moscow at the time. Szalontai provides the relevant information on Ch'ollima in his book, citing a Hungarian embassy report that bears the same date as the non-existent Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> : 09/15/1959 (122).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlSZNrdFRCOTBDREU/view?usp=sharing
41 PF	"Even power generation was pushed to the local level, with farmers' cooperatives using corn to fuel power plants. This took some of the burden off of the large hydroelectric generators, whose power could be used instead for the state-run heavy industries."	Page 104 Footnote 46	1958 1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 7 11/10/1959	Russian	The cited source, Soviet ambassador Puzanov's Pyongyang journal, has no entry for 11/10/1959, because he was in Moscow at the time. Szalontai, drawing on a Hungarian source that bears the same date as the non-existent Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , provides this information in his book (122).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlVVOSEhRX3JwNmc/view?usp=sharing
42 PF	"Government policy attempted to improve living conditions to a certain extent: in August the prices of dozens of consumer goods were cut by an average of 20% (although not basic foodstuffs, such as rice and flour), and the government announced on January 1, 1959, that wages would be raised by 40 percent overall."	Page 104 Footnote 48	1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 7 02/24/1959	Russian	The cited source, the Soviet ambassador's Pyongyang journal, has no entry for 02/24/1959. Nor do entries near the missing date provide this information. Citing Hungarian sources, one of which bears the exact same date as <i>Tyranny</i> 's non-existent Soviet ambassadorial entry, Szalontai discusses the relevant information in his book (123).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlQnYycnZjN1NXVjQ/view?usp=sharing
43 PF	"But the consumer economy was based on a rationing system that was highly regulated and relatively Spartan. In 1959, ordinary workers received 700 grams of grain (rice and wheat) per day, skilled workers 800 grams, and miners 1,000 grams. Children received 350-400 grams."	Page 104 Footnote 49	1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 7 October 1959	Russian	The cited source, Soviet Ambassador Puzanov's Pyongyang journal, has no entry in October 1959 that contains this information. Szalontai's book, citing a Hungarian source that similarly specifies only the month (October 1959) but not the day, provides the exact same information (123).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlS0dsMGhIN2pPOTA/view?usp=sharing
44 PU	"Rapid industrialization drew many young peasants from the country to the city, which both aggravated the agricultural labor shortage and put strains on urban services."	Pages 104-105 Footnote 52	1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 7 12/15/1959	Russian	The cited folder does include a file that contains the information described above, but the date of this file is 12/10/1959, not 12/15/1959. The entry for 12/10/1959 bears no relation to the text. Szalontai's book, citing a Hungarian source dated 12/15/1959, provides the exact same information (148).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlCFgta1N2YjVuSXcviw/view?usp=sharing

45 PF	"East German advisors noted that 'volunteer' labor had become more demanding and less productive. On top of the enforced labor were the frequent political meetings and study sessions, adding even more hours to the day. Complaining about any of this was, of course, strictly punished."	Page 105 Footnote 53	1959	Archival MfAA A 06/04/1959	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin) no document with this date can be found in the folder given. Citing Hungarian sources, one of which has a date identical to that of the apparently non-existent East German one, Szalontai offers the relevant information his book (124).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTINjISRdMOXJiQzg/vi ew?usp=sharing
46 PF	"The Ch'ollima campaign was launched after students were recalled from Eastern Europe, meaning that many of those who had studied abroad had not yet completed their training, and in any case they were not trusted because of their exposure to 'counterrevolutionary influences.'"	Page 105 Footnote 55	1960	Archival "Report on Political Conditions in DPRK" AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 20 Papka 35 Delo 5 06/03/1960	Russian	In the Korea-related files of AVPRF, Opis 20 usually holds documents dated 1964. Documents dated 1960 are usually held in Opis 16. In Opis 16, Papka 87, Delo 27, there is a document titled "Economic and Political Conditions in the DPRK" (06/12/1960). In Opis 16, Papka 87, Delo 29, there is a document titled "The Economy of the DPRK (brief overview)" (06/11/1960). None of the two documents contains the information described above. Szalontai's book, citing a Hungarian source dated 06/03/1960, provides the relevant information (125).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTITGdkSFVpNENVMdA/view?usp=sharing
47 PU	"Poor supervision combined with impossible production quotas resulted inevitably in shoddy output as well as frequent industrial accidents, which (as in the Soviet Union under Stalin) were often blamed on sabotage. Alleged saboteurs were arrested and punished severely."	Page 105 Footnote 56	1959	Archival "Political Conditions DPRK" AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 83 Delo 33 02/05/1959	Russian	The cited source folder contains a Soviet document dated 02/05/1959, but it bears a different title, i.e., "DPRK (Brief overview)," and does not contain the information discussed in <i>Tyranny</i> . Szalontai's book, citing Hungarian sources, provides the relevant information (125).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIWVHNBY1JCSmNfM2s/view?usp=sharing
48 PU	"In a conversation with a Soviet diplomat in 1960, Pang Hak-se, minister of the interior, referred to some 100,000 'reactionaries' detained..."	Page 105 Footnote 57	1960	Secondary Scalapino & Lee <i>Communism in Korea</i> 1972 p.833-835	English	The content of the cited source, which was published decades before the relevant East Bloc archives were released, bears no relation to the text. The information in <i>Tyranny</i> 's text can be found in an endnote in Szalontai's book (on page 297), in which Dr. Andrei Lankov is thanked for personally imparting the information. Armstrong's footnote cites the irrelevant American source, right down to the page numbers, that comes further down in Szalontai's endnote (in regard to a very different piece of information).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIVnhS a2Rkd2lqTEU/vi ew?usp=sharing
49 PF	"Some were merely purged or demoted, others sent to the countryside for physical labor, and others were executed. New provincial courts were set up to try collaborators, and those condemned to death faced public executions. [Fn 59] Factory directors and heads of factory party committees who failed to reach the planning targets were replaced and often publicly criticized as 'hostile elements.'" [Fn. 60]	Page 105 Footnotes 59 and 60	1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 83 Delo 33 02/24/1959	Russian	The cited source folder has three documents, none of which is dated 02/24/1959. (They are dated 02/05/1959, 08/15/1959, and 09/26/1959.) None contains the information discussed in <i>Tyranny</i> . Szalontai, drawing from a Hungarian source with the same date as the apparently non-existent Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , i.e., 02/24/1959, contains this information in his book (126, 128).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTieV9T ekhXSXRkYkU/view?usp=sharing
50 PF	"Kim Il Sung declared in early 1959 that grain production would soon reach 7 million metric tons, or more than twice the current output."	Page 108 Footnote 73	1960	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 85 Delo 6 03/20/1960	Russian	The cited folder, the Pyongyang journal of Ambassador Puzanov from 02/16/1960 to 06/11/1960, contains no entry for 03/20/1960. Szalontai's book, citing Hungarian sources (of which one is dated 03/20/1964), provides the relevant information (136).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIUmc0V296TGZ0OG8/view?usp=sharing

51 PU	<p>"When Kim Il Sung met with Khrushchev in Moscow after the CPSU Twenty-First Congress in 1959, Khrushchev chastised the Koreans for neglecting cooperation with fraternal countries and trying to produce everything by themselves. Khrushchev told Kim bluntly that the DPRK Five-Year Plan was not realistic and that the Koreans could not build a modern economy "solely on the dynamism and economy of the workers," according to later Soviet reports of the meeting. Khrushchev's lectures must have seemed scolding and patronizing to Kim, and no doubt contributed to Kim's negative opinion of the Soviet leader. The Koreans did not argue, but neither did they apply Soviet criticism to any change in their economic policies.</p> <p>Nevertheless, despite their differences, the USSR and DPRK signed a new agreement on technical cooperation in March, and Soviet loans contributed to the building of several new factories. Although they disagreed with the economic policies North Korea was pursuing, the Soviets seemed to feel that the North Koreans, like wayward children, "should realize the mistakes on the basis of their own experiences."</p>	Page 108-109 Footnote 74-75	1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 7 12/16/1959	Russian	<p>Although the cited source, Soviet Ambassador Puzanov's journal, reports on 12/16/1959 on a conversation with Kim Il Sung, it makes no mention of a) Khrushchev's criticism of North Korean economic policies, b) North Korean reluctance to report on Khrushchev's U.S. visit, or c) Soviet pressure to make the North Koreans publish details of it.</p> <p>Szalontai's book, citing a Hungarian source with the same date, i.e., 12/16/1959, provides all details in his book (137-138, 143).</p>	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIUWFrUEsxTXU5ZGM/view?usp=sharing
	"The North Koreans were reluctant to publish the details of Khrushchev's visit to the United States, until pressured to do so by the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang."	Page 123 Footnote 135					
52 PU	"In February 1960 Kim Il Sung gave "on-the-spot guidance" at a number of villages, including Chõngsan-ri in South P'yõngan Province. He criticized earlier government policies for making peasants less motivated to produce and declared that the DPRK needed a vast increase in the number of cadres trained in agricultural methods. Local party committees were to be reorganized, and thousands of agricultural scientists were to be sent to the countryside to improve the quality of life and increase productivity. A new system of bonuses would be introduced, and members of work units that fulfilled their quotas would get 10 percent of the crop in addition to their regular income. Workers on state farms, and later on cooperatives as well, were allowed to keep anything produced beyond what the central plan required."	Page 110 Footnote 85	1960	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 85 Delo 6 03/30/1960	Russian	<p>The cited source contains no reference to the topics described.</p> <p>(The relevant Soviet document on the topic is dated 03/17/1960, and is in a different folder.)</p> <p>Szalontai, citing a Hungarian document with the same date as the irrelevant Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> (03/30/1960), gives this information in his book (150).</p>	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlanJxdVMtQzVYTg/iew?usp=sharing
53 D	"Zhou Enlai, meeting with Kim Il Sung in November 1958, similarly promised Kim China's noninterference in North Korea's internal affairs."	Page 113 Footnote 96	1958	Archival Record of Meeting between Premier Zhou Enlai and Premier Kim Il Sung 11/22/1958 CFMA No. 204-0064-02	Chinese	The source cited does not support the text, as it contains neither an explicit nor an implicit promise of noninterference.	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIZHprbEp5Y1RueUU/iew?usp=sharing
54 PU	"A number of high ranking academics were also expelled from the party, for supposedly siding with the anti-Kim oppositionists. Purges took place as well within the upper ranks of the military."	Page 114 Footnote 98	1957	Archival "Interview with DPRK Foreign Ministry First Secretary Pak Kil-yong" AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 121 Papka 7 Delo 16 10/04/1957	Russian	<p>The conversation (the actual archival location of which is Opis 13, Papka 7, Delo 6) bears no relation to this text.</p> <p>(Note also that Pak Kil-yong is specified in the actual Soviet document as head of the 1st Department of the Foreign Ministry, not as "Foreign Ministry First Secretary." In the Soviet ministerial hierarchy, there was no such position as First Secretary.)</p> <p>Szalontai, citing Hungarian sources, describes the relevant purge in his book (117). There the original source of the information is specified as the First Secretary of the Polish Embassy.</p>	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlbV9WVWtfrR21FemM/view?usp=sharing

55 PF	"Formal negotiations over the repatriation issue began in early 1959 between the Red Cross organizations of Japan and North Korea. On August 13 the two sides agreed on the terms of the repatriation at a meeting in Calcutta, and despite strong opposition from South Korea, repatriation began in December."	Page 117 Footnote 109	1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 1 09/02/1959	Russian	The cited source folder covers reports dated from April to August 1959, thus contains no document dated 09/02/1959. Nor does it contain any document discussing the 08/13/1959 meeting. (The Soviet document that does discuss it is dated 08/20/1959 and contained in another folder entirely.) Szalontai's book, citing a Hungarian source bearing the same date as the apparently non-existent Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> (09/02/1959), mentions the 08/13/1959 meeting (146).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlZXAtempVaUtCc1U/vi ew? usp=sharing
56 PF	"The DPRK asked other socialist countries for assistance in the process, and the Soviet Union agreed to provide the repatriation ships, while other countries helped out financially."	Page 117 Footnote 110	1960	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 2 02/29/1960	Russian	The cited source does not exist. The cited folder contains only a few files about a Soviet-DPRK agreement, dated 09/15/1950 and 09/15/1959, and thus it cannot contain a file dated 02/29/1960. Szalontai's book, citing a Hungarian source bearing the same date as the non-existent Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , provides the information in his book (146).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlbHFGU3Fxb0Vkv2M/view? usp=sharing
57 PU	"Nor, as even Kim Il Sung admitted to the Soviet ambassador in 1959, was there any active, clandestine communist movement that could be North Korea's fifth column."	Page 119 Footnote 120	1959	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 7 12/19/1959	Russian	The cited source, Soviet Ambassador Puzanov's journal entry for 12/19/1959, reports on a conversation with Kim Il Sung, but makes no reference to the absence of a communist movement in South Korea. Szalontai, drawing on the relevant Hungarian material, gives a less categorical version of Kim's admission in his book (170), i.e. that there was "no substantial illegal Communist activity" in the South. The textual context of Kim's statement is extensively similar in <i>Tyranny</i> and <i>Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era</i> .	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlbGRMTRoAS1Hck0/view? usp=sharing
58 PF	"At first, the DPRK leadership was willing to see the Park coup in a positive light. For one thing, the nationalist orientation of the military might create a better atmosphere for dialogue."	Page 119 Footnote 122	1961	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 85 Delo 8 05/20/1961	Russian	The chronological range of this folder is from 01/11/1960 to 12/15/1960. Therefore it cannot contain a file dated 05/20/1961. Nor does it contain any other file relevant to the information it is cited to corroborate. Szalontai, citing a Hungarian source with the same date as the apparently non-existent Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , i.e., 05/20/1961, provides this information in his book (175).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlEgE5M1duamxEaHM/view? usp=sharing
59 U	"On the evening of the coup, North Korean officials informed the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang that they believed the coup was the work of 'independent progressive forces' in the South Korean military. Two days later, with the junta harshly clamping down on internal dissent, the North Koreans saw the coup as a US-led plot to quell unrest in South Korea and keep the ROK in their orbit. Although the North Koreans did not make the parallel explicit, they now saw the South Korean military coup as, in effect, the American equivalent of the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary. Nevertheless, there remained progressive elements in the military, even if they were not at the forefront, and South Korea retained a revolutionary potential that the North should encourage. Thus, the DPRK could talk to the new Seoul military government in the hopes of cultivating the progressive and 'patriotic' (i.e., pro-Pyongyang) elements operating behind the scenes in South Korea."	Pages 119-120 Footnote 124	1961	Archival CFMA No. 106-00581-04 05/18/1961	Chinese	The actual content of this Chinese folder contains no reference to North Korean officials briefing PRC diplomats in Pyongyang. It seems that this information was actually derived from two translated and publicly accessible CFMA files, which are not in the cited folder. Both the statement about North Korean officials briefing the Chinese embassy and the quote on the role of "progressive forces" can be found in the following document: "Situation of the South Korean Military Coup". Dated 05/16/1961, it can be found in 106-00581-03, 19-20. The latter half of <i>Tyranny's</i> description about the coup can be linked to another CFMA document, also available in translation, titled "Contents of the May 18th North Korean Party Central Standing Committee Meeting" and dated 05/21/1961. The archival location of this telegram is 106-00581-06, 32-33.	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIT2d0YnlqX0NMRG8/view? usp=sharing

60 PF	"In September 1961, the Park regime indeed began to hold secret talks with the DPRK, and for some months the North Korean media refrained from criticizing and insulting the ROK government as it had throughout the Syngman Rhee period."	Page 120 Footnote 125	1961	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 85 Delo 8 09/24/1961	Russian	The cited folder does not contain any document about the topic described above. The chronological range of this folder is from 01/11/1960 to 12/15/1960, and thus it cannot contain a file dated 09/24/1961. Szalontai, citing a Hungarian source with the same date as the apparently non-existent Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , i.e., 09/24/1961, provides this information in his book (178-179).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlMDNGMTk1X2xycXM/view?usp=sharing
61 PF	"But Pyongyang's overtures failed to divide the South Koreans from the United States, on whom the ROK was still deeply dependent. With the Park-led junta firmly in place, and after Park's visit to Washington in November, the Kennedy administration reaffirmed its commitment to close ROK-US ties. By the end of 1961, the DPRK appears to have given up on advancing North-South dialogue, and the North Korea media was again referring to the southern regime as "fascist" and Park himself as a Japan-lover and American puppet."	Page 120 Footnote 126	1961	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 85 Delo 8 11/15/1961	Russian	The cited folder contains no document related to this topic. The chronological range of this folder is from 01/11/1960 to 12/15/1960. Therefore it cannot and does not contain a file dated 11/15/1961. Szalontai, citing a Hungarian source with the same date as the apparently non-existent Soviet one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , i.e., 11/15/1961, provides this information in his book (179).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlRzNyMzA1RnJOUVU/view?usp=sharing
62 PF	"Although North Korea (along with South Korea) was excluded from the Bandung Conference in Indonesia later that year, an event that effectively launched the nonaligned movement, the DPRK media covered the event quite positively."	Page 121 Footnote 128	1955	Secondary <i>Chosŏn chugang nyŏngam</i> [Korea Annual] Pyongyang, 1955	Korean	The North Korean annual or yearbook was not issued in 1955. The Bandung conference was described in the 1956 yearbook, published in June 1956. <i>Tyranny</i> thus manifests both the same error and the same lack of a page number as does Barry Gills' book <i>Korea versus Korea</i> (1996, p. 63), while describing the same topic in strikingly similar terms. Note that the author of <i>Tyranny</i> cites Gills' book in the preceding footnote (number 127).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlRzR2bmx1QmRDT3c/view?usp=sharing
63 PU	"Armed security forces were sent to guard the East European embassies, a practice which, the East German embassy remarked, exceeded the security presence in East Berlin -- a city much deeper in 'enemy territory.'"	Page 121 Footnote 129	1960	Archival MfAA A 7064 08/15/1960	German	The only document findable under that date and in that folder is an irrelevant letter to the GDR embassy in regard to a railway-related conference. Szalontai, citing (<i>inter alia</i>) a Hungarian document with the exact same date, namely 08/15/1960, provides the same information in his book, while referring to East Berlin (more correctly) as "nearer to enemy territory" (161).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlGtP R0JnM1RRbjA/view?usp=sharing
64 PF/ PD	"For example, in November 1960 a Korean visited the Bulgarian embassy, trying to send a message to the Bulgarian Communist Party critical of the KWP and asking the Bulgarians to help the North Korean Party "correct" its mistakes. North Korean security forces entered the embassy, despite the protests of the embassy staff, and arrested the Korean. This was the last such incident at the Bulgarian embassy; the Bulgarian ambassador remarked to his Soviet counterpart that he had never seen such a hostile incident in another "fraternal" country."	Page 121 Footnote 130	1960	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 85 Delo 7 11/30/1960	Russian	The incident is misrepresented; North Korean security forces did not enter the embassy to arrest the dissident, who in fact was arrested after leaving it. The cited source, Soviet Ambassador Puzanov's journal, contains no entry for the date of the document cited in <i>Tyranny</i> . Puzanov was not even in Pyongyang at the time of the event described. Citing a Hungarian source with the same date as <i>Tyranny</i> 's non-existent Soviet one, Szalontai provides the relevant information in his book (161-162).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlWxhT OE5fZcYQmM/view?usp=sharing
65 PF	"The KWP Central Committee in October 1960 criticized obsequious attitudes towards foreign countries and mindless imitation of things foreign, a practice it labeled <i>sadaejjuŭi</i> , or 'flunkeyism,' as the term was officially translated in later North Korean texts. This term cropped up in numerous party publications and speeches by officials over the next several months, and the "factionalists" of 1956 were also accused of practicing <i>sadaejjuŭi</i> ."	Page 122 Footnote 131	1960	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 85 Delo 7 11/28/1960	Russian	This source apparently does not exist. The alleged author of the source, the Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang (Puzanov), was not in town at the time in question. The information in Armstrong's text can be found in a passage (based on a Hungarian source with the same date as the non-existent Soviet one cited) in Szalontai's book (162).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlChpBcHdfMl9kRkE/vi ew?usp=sharing

66 PU	<p>"The North Koreans had been preparing for Khrushchev's visit since the summer and expected it in October to coincide with his visit to China. It would be the first visit by a top Soviet leader to the DPRK, and virtually the entire city of Pyongyang was mobilized to clean up the city and organize the welcoming parade. But at the last minute, Khrushchev informed the North Koreans from Beijing that he would not make it to Korea after all -- in part, the Soviets implied, so as not to antagonize the United States."</p>	<p>Pages 123-124 Footnote 136</p>	<p>1959</p>	<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 15 Papka 81 Delo 7 10/07/1959</p>	<p>Russian</p>	<p>The cited source is Soviet Ambassador Puzanov's Pyongyang journal. The entry for 10/07/1959 makes no reference to Khrushchev's visit.</p> <p>Even when taken together, the entries for 09/24/1959, 10/02/1959, and 10/03/1959 contain only some of the information discussed.</p> <p>Szalontai's book provides all this information (143-144) based on Hungarian sources, one of which is dated 10/07/1959.</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlXzIESjNnTOR0yAJvieu?usp=sharing</p>
67 PF	<p>"According to East European reports, Kim told the KWP Central Committee in the spring of 1962 that the Soviet Union might one day cast aside the DPRK as they had Albania, and that the North Korean people must be prepared for such an eventuality. [Fn 143] [...] A major shake-up of the party sent many midlevel officials out to the provinces, and the East Europeans noted even greater restrictions on contact between Koreans and foreigners, and a tightening of political controls over the population as a whole." [Fn 146]</p>	<p>Pages 125-126 Footnotes 143 and 146</p>	<p>1962</p>	<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 87 Delo 29 04/05/1962</p>	<p>Russian</p>	<p>The cited folder contains no document related to this information. The chronological range of this folder is from 05/16/1960 to 10/18/1960, and thus it cannot contain a file dated 04/05/1962.</p> <p>Citing Hungarian sources, of which one has the same date as <i>Tyranny's</i> non-existent Soviet one, Szalontai provides the relevant information in his book (180-181 and 183).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlRSmZ2jWTZCS2c4V0Ujview?usp=sharing</p>
68 PF	<p>"Issues of Soviet periodicals that covered sensitive subjects such as Stalinism and the Albanian question were withheld from circulation. [Fn: 145] [...] Events in China were covered extensively in the North Korean media, exceeding Soviet news in quantity and level of praise. Chinese officials, such as CCP Politburo member and Beijing mayor Peng Zhen, who visited in April–May 1962, made a point of lauding North Korea's economic development efforts and the revolutionary enthusiasm of its people. [Fn: 148]"</p>	<p>Pages 125-126 Footnotes 145 and 148</p>	<p>1962</p>	<p>Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 87 Delo 29 02/05/1962</p>	<p>Russian</p>	<p>The cited folder contains no document about the topic described above. The chronological range of this folder is from 05/16/1960 to 10/18/1960, and thus it cannot contain a file dated 02/05/1962. That date is in any case before the described events that occurred in April-May 1962.</p> <p>Citing Hungarian sources, of which one has the same date as <i>Tyranny's</i> non-existent Soviet one, Szalontai provides the relevant information in his book (181 and 184-185).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlRudFvEEN5NjFfTFE/view?usp=sharing</p>
69 PD	<p>"But the Germans predicted—accurately, as it turns out—that this leaning toward China would not last indefinitely, and that North Korea would have to move back toward the Soviet position, for economic reasons if nothing else. China simply could not offer North Korea the aid and exchange the KWP leadership desired. The policy of self-reliance was not sufficient for North Korea to reach its industrial goals; unlike the Albanian leadership, satisfied with leaving Albania a backward agrarian country, North Korea's leaders had grand developmental ambitions for the DPRK economy. Despite the rhetoric of closeness to China, good economic relations with Eastern Europe were indispensable for North Korea to fulfill these ambitions. North Korea may have been closer to China economically, but practically speaking the DPRK would have no choice but to swing back to the 'true Marxist-Leninist' camp sooner or later."</p>	<p>Page 127 Footnote 151</p>	<p>1963</p>	<p>Archival "The Influence of the Chinese Communist Party on the Politics of the KWP." MfAA A 7174 05/28/1963 08/04/1963 [sic; should be 04/08/1963]</p>	<p>German</p>	<p>Armstrong's text is only undermined by the cited sources. The misdated one (4 August should be 8 April) emphasizes the "complete congruence" of the Chinese and North Korean political lines, while emphasizing that in economic policy, the DPRK appears to be adhering more closely to Soviet bloc than to Chinese practice.</p> <p>The May document states that North Korea, for all its rhetoric of self-reliance, remains economically dependent on its allies, especially the USSR.</p> <p>Neither source contains any prediction of the DPRK's return to the Soviet camp or a comparison between Albanian and North Korean economic conditions. In his book, Szalontai explains the post-1964 Soviet-DPRK reconciliation by contrasting North Korea's economic conditions with those of Albania (206-207).</p>	<p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-Myf7BSAS8DMjVPOGtyaG02bTA/view?usp=sharing</p> <p>https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B-Myf7BSAS8DNVRsMgikWfVHRV/view?usp=sharing</p>

70 PU	"Three months later Liu Shaoqi made a return visit to the DPRK, where he had a series of meetings with Kim Il Sung and Ch'oe Yong-gŏn. Later in the year, the two countries carried [sic] joint military exercises and signed a new agreement on economic exchange."	Page 128 Footnote 154	1963	Archival CFMA No. 203-00566-05 9/15/1963	Chinese	The cited source is dated earlier than the joint military exercises and economic agreement, thus cannot and does not refer to them. Furthermore, the information on joint exercises could not be found in any of the cited secondary sources. The information in Armstrong's text can, however, be found in Szalontai's book (200). Szalontai cites several Hungarian documents from 1963-64 as well as Chung, <i>Pyongyang Between Peking and Moscow</i> .	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIN3Q0ZGNKM3lydEE/view?usp=sharing
71 PF	"Within North Korea, the chill in DPRK-Soviet relations was expressed through increased harassment and monitoring of Soviet and East European technicians and diplomats. Foreign specialists in the DPRK were now required to be fingerprinted and had to report in detail to the North Korean authorities all of their movements, contacts, and Korean friends."	Page 129 Footnote 158	1964	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 16 Papka 87 Delo 230 10/18/1964	Russian	In the Korea-related files of AVPRF, Opis 16, Papka 87 holds documents dated 1960, rather than 1964. Documents dated 1964 are usually held in Opis 20. Citing Hungarian sources, of which the last one has the same date as <i>Tyranny's</i> alleged Soviet one, Szalontai provides the relevant information in his book (201).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlaWtIOUNGaHJKdEk/view?usp=sharing
72 PD	"The DPRK even passed a law in 1963 forbidding marriages between Koreans and foreigners, meaning almost entirely marriages with East Europeans. Mixed-race couples were forced to move out of Pyongyang, and Koreans were pressured to divorce their European spouses. The GDR ambassador denounced this law, and the attitude of 'racial purity' it implied, as nothing short of 'Göbbelsian.'"	Page 129 Footnote 159	1963	Archival SAPMO-BA DY 30, IV A2/20/251 (12/02) 1963	German	The East German document does mention a North Korean campaign against mixed marriages, but makes no reference to Goebbels, racial purity, or a law against mixed marriages. [Note that the Nazi propagandist's name is not written in German with an umlaut.] Citing Hungarian documents, Szalontai offers the relevant information (including a quotation of the GDR ambassador's words on Goebbels) in his book (201). <i>Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era</i> mentions no law against mixed marriages in the DPRK, but refers to the formal prohibition of mixed marriages in Albania and China.	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIY0NWSThGMU5bG8/view?usp=sharing
73 PF	"In retaliation, the Soviet, Hungarian, East German and other Soviet-bloc governments restricted the activities of the North Korean embassies in their countries and refused to allow them to publicize the DPRK's antirevisionist propaganda."	Page 129 Footnote 160	1963	Archival MfAA A 7126 12/19/1963	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with that date can be found in the folder given. Citing a Hungarian document whose date is identical with that of the non-existent MfAA file, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (201).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIZTVXQmpTR2xCSE/E/view?usp=sharing
74 PF	"In January 1964, Foreign Minister Pak Song-ch'ŏl told the East German ambassador that, while the East Germans took a passive approach to Western imperialism, the North Koreans reacted strongly to any provocation from the South."	Page 129 Footnote 162	1964	Archival MfAA A 7135 02/01/1964	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with that date can be found in the folder given. Citing a Hungarian document, whose date is identical with that of the non-existent MfAA file, Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (202).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTleW13cXNZbHotZ1U/view?usp=sharing
75 PF	"The first economic plan formulated since Juche had become the cornerstone of North Korean ideology, the Seven-Year Plan set out to produce machine tools, electric trains, and other sophisticated industrial goods all with local materials and manpower."	Page 130 Footnote 165	1964	Archival MfAA A 7135 03/20/1964	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with that date can be found in the folder given. Citing a Hungarian document, the date of which is identical with the apparently non-existent East German one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (178).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIZjM4TGJRcktzU2s/viiew?usp=sharing
76 PF	"An official of the DPRK Foreign Ministry told the East German ambassador bluntly that North Korean might soon have to 'liberate' the South by force in order to save the suffering South Korean people; the inter-German policy of coexistence could not apply to the relationship between North Korea and the southern 'fascists.' [Fn: 168] As early as April 1962 the slogan <i>chŏnmin mujanghwa</i> ('arming the whole people') began to make its appearance in the DPRK in the provinces as well as in the capital. [Fn: 169]"	Page 131 Footnotes 168 and 169	1962	Archival MfAA A 7126 03/29/1962	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with that date can be found in the folder given. The date of the document (29 March) is incompatible with some of the described events that occurred in April. Citing two Hungarian documents, the first of which has a date identical with the apparently non-existent East German one cited in <i>Tyranny</i> , Szalontai offers the relevant information in his book (188-189).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIU0o4SkhwQ3Zhd1k/view?usp=sharing

77 PF	"By the middle of the year, the KPA was put on a permanent state of high alert."	Page 131 Footnote 170	1962	Archival MfAA A 7126 August 1962	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with this date could be found in the folder given. Citing a Hungarian document, Szalontai provides the relevant information in <i>Kim Il Sung</i> (189). The next footnote in <i>Kim Il Sung</i> cites a Hungarian document dated August 1962. Notably, neither this document nor the cited GDR document specifies the day of the report.	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIQmtFTk9SMWVJc3c/view?usp=sharing
78 PF	"Major new defense facilities were built in the vicinity of Kanggye in Chagang Province, where the remnants of the DPRK government had retreated during the darkest days of the Korean War. All foreigners, including East European allies, were expressly forbidden from entering Chagang Province after November 1962."	Page 131 Footnote 171	1962	Archival MfAA A 7135 11/12/1962	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with this date could be found in the folder given. Citing two Hungarian documents, of which the first has a date identical with that of the cited GDR document, Szalontai provides the relevant information in <i>Kim Il Sung</i> (189, 192).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTILUI2WFdTTmFPR3c/view?usp=sharing
79 PF	"Kim Il Sung, through the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang, asked the USSR to increase its military assistance to the DPRK in mid-October, citing the critical position of North Korea's half-million-man army on the front lines against imperialism."	Pages 131-132 Footnote 172	1962	Archival MfAA A 7135 10/27/1962	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with this date could be found in the folder given. Citing a Hungarian document whose date is identical, Szalontai provides the relevant information in <i>Kim Il Sung</i> (189).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIVWxEjNWJYN1hqQ1k/view?usp=sharing
80 PU	"North Korea's mountainous terrain, Kim told the Soviet ambassador, would weaken the effect of nuclear weapons and help his country to defend itself against the Americans."	Page 132 Footnote 176	1963	Secondary Scalapino and Lee <i>Communism in Korea</i> (1972) pp. 595-596	English	The cited publication does not contain this information. (The relevant archival sources were inaccessible to Western scholars in 1972.) Citing a Hungarian archival document, Szalontai provides the information in <i>Kim Il Sung</i> (193). The attendant endnote is 99, which appears on page 313 of Szalontai's book. But note that the preceding endnote, which pertains to a different matter, refers to Scalapino and Lee, <i>Communism in Korea</i> (595-596).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIQ2REZDA5c0hxZTQ/view?usp=sharing
81 PF	"The DPRK leadership did not seriously expect an attack from the South, as North Korean officials admitted in their candid conversations with some of the East European diplomats. The North Koreans recognized that the Park regime was occupied with stabilizing the political situation and improving the South Korean economy. But the urgency of the North Korean military buildup arose, in part, from the very fact that the Park regime was becoming more stable and therefore reduced the possibility that pro-North Korean forces would take power in the South soon. 'Peaceful Unification' was less likely to be in North Korea's interest than it might have been earlier, and the term itself was dropped from DPRK propaganda at the time."	Page 132-133 Footnote 177	1963	Archival MfAA A 7126 02/15/1963	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with this date could be found in the folder given. Citing a Hungarian document whose date is identical with the apparently non-existent East German one, Szalontai provides the relevant information in <i>Kim Il Sung</i> (189).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlajF2eDVHS3QxdmM/view?usp=sharing
82 PF	"In April 1963 Kim Il Sung spoke to the Soviet ambassador about the state of the North Korean economy and admitted that the DPRK would have to invest more in mining and mineral extraction before they could build up manufacturing as they had hoped. Factory production was falling far short of expectations, a year into the Seven-Year Plan. Agriculture was not in the best of shape either, and the goal of 'complete mechanization of agriculture,' as North Korea had been announcing since the mid-1950s, was simply unrealistic. The vast majority of agricultural production was still the result of human and animal labor, and there remained an acute labor shortage in the countryside."	Page 134 Footnote 181	1963	Archival MfAA A 7050 05/08/1963	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with this date could be found in the folder given. Citing a Hungarian document whose date is identical, Szalontai provides the relevant information in <i>Kim Il Sung</i> (195).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIR0dXYWJUNkWRzg/view?usp=sharing

83 PF	"The year 1963 looked likely to be another year of hunger, similar to 1955. East European residents observed that distribution of essential food items was scanty in towns and villages, and most of the private markets had disappeared."	Page 134 Footnote 182	1963	Archival MfAA A 7050 05/02/1963	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with this date could be found in the folder given. Citing a Hungarian document whose date is identical, Szalontai provides the relevant information in <i>Kim Il Sung</i> (196).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlV2dPeUjW/SjA1WG8/view?usp=sharing
84 PF	"Consumer goods in general were in short supply, and what was available tended to be of very poor quality. At a plenum in September 1963, the KWP Central Committee called for an increase in the production of consumer goods but did not allocate more resources for this production increase. Rather, the state exhorted factories to diversify and expand existing production into consumer items, and called for more necessary items to be produced at the local level. "Juche in economics" meant in effect making do with little or nothing from the central state, which is what the term would continue to mean in the long years of economic decline ahead."	Page 134 Footnote 183	1963	Archival MfAA A 7050 05/21/1962	German	According to the Political Archive (Berlin), no document with this date could be found in the folder given. The date of the cited document (05/21/1962) is incompatible with some of the described events that occurred in September 1963 and afterward. Citing Hungarian documents, of which the first has the same date as the apparently non-existent East German document, Szalontai provides the relevant information in <i>Kim Il Sung</i> (196).	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTleE1BUjRnVHRrbFE/view?usp=sharing
85 PU	"Privately, socialist officials, particularly the Soviets, saw the North Korean action as excessively confrontational and ultimately counterproductive, likely to strengthen the hands of the American hawks with regard to Vietnam, not to mention bringing the United States and North Korea to the brink of open warfare."	Page 152 Footnote 41	1968	Archival AVPRF Fond 0102 Opis 28 Papka 55 Delo 2 01/31/1968	Russian	The cited file, an English translation of which (by Sergey Radchenko) is publicly accessible, does not contain this information. The relevant information can be found in a Hungarian archival document, translated by Balazs Szalontai and made publicly accessible in NKIDP's Digital Archives. Neither translator is acknowledged in <i>Tyranny</i> .	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTleFItV1pvTkdWU3c/vi ew?usp=sharing
86 D	"The Soviet crackdown on the Budapest uprising in 1956 was a cause for concern in Beijing and Pyongyang; among other things the crackdown resulted, as we saw in the previous chapter, in Pyongyang withdrawing North Korean students from Hungary.... North Korean anxiety about Soviet intervention was not expressed publicly at the time. The Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was another matter. Needless to say, neither China nor North Korea was in sympathy with the ... Czech dissenters. Their concern was with Moscow's blatant intervention into the affairs of a fellow socialist state Chinese media attacked the Czech [sic] intervention in the most vitriolic of language. North Korea's response was fairly mild in comparison. The <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> published an article entitled "Historical Lessons We Have Learned From the Study of Affairs in Czechoslovakia." The most important "lesson" was the one North Korea had long emphasized: the inviolable right of all nations to self-determination. Juche was, as much as anything, a position of independence in the Sino-Soviet Cold War."	Page 156 Footnote 50	1968	Newspaper <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> 08/23/1968	Korean	The content of the <i>Rodong Sinmun</i> article bears no relation to and even directly contradicts the characterization of it in <i>Tyranny</i> , being in fact an endorsement of the hostile Soviet line on Prague and the Czechoslovak "revisionists." The original title is in fact: "Chesükkosüllöbensükko satae-üi ryöksajök kyohun" = The Historical Lesson(s) of the Situation in Czechoslovakia.]"	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTlaTRUYk1POTzvYwC/view?usp=sharing
87 D	"In 1974, Iran discussed exporting oil to the DPRK in exchange for North Korean minerals. The staunchly pro-US Iranian government assured the DPRK that Tehran supported Korean unification 'without outside influences'."	Page 185 Footnote 56	1974	Archival MfAA A 7050 04/23/1974	German	The actual date of the document is 04/26/1974. It records a conversation between Iranian Ambassador Abbas Ahram and GDR Ambassador Everhartz, which took place at the GDR Embassy in Pyongyang (rather than in Beijing, as claimed in <i>Tyranny</i>) on 04/25/1974. The document contains no reference to Iranian support for Korean reunification "without outside influences."	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIR1BaSDB0ZHJzeFk/view?usp=sharing

88 D	"A Soviet embassy official in Pyongyang recounted in detail to the East German ambassador the hundreds of millions of rubles owed them for North Korean projects, including the construction of a nuclear power plant; the continuing demands the North Koreans made of them; and the unlikelihood that these debts would be paid until 1990 or so (a particularly inauspicious date, as it turned out)."	Page 189 Footnote 72	1976	Archival MfAA C 6584 02/10/1976	German	<p>The East German diplomat mentioned was named Steinhöfer, rather than Steinhoffer; his actual position was embassy counselor, not ambassador.</p> <p>The document mentions planned work on two thermal power stations. The USSR never helped the DPRK build a nuclear power plant. Nor does the document refer to the "unlikelihood that these debts would be paid until 1990 or so." Instead, it mentions a) the DPRK's request to postpone the starting date of the debt repayment from 1976 to 1980, and b) the USSR's insistence that part of the debt be already repaid by 1980.</p>	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTIVHM1YXhwZVRLNUO/view?usp=sharing
89 U	"According to the recollections of Vadim Medvedev, then Central Committee secretary in charge of relations with fellow socialist countries, Kim praised Gorbachev's outreach to the United States and reassured him that improved US-Soviet relations "would also help resolve the Korea problem."	Page 249 Footnote 20	1994	Secondary Vadim A. Medvedev <i>Raspad</i> (1994) p. 324	Russian	<p>The cited book does not contain this information, either on p. 324 or elsewhere.</p> <p>The actual source of the information is an East German archival document dated 10/18/1986, Grace Leonard's English translation of which (unacknowledged in <i>Tyranny</i>) is publicly accessible in NKIDP's Digital Archives.</p>	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTITGFNR3hpY0F5NEE/view?usp=sharing
90 P	"As Kim put it, 'The people of South Korea would support socialism, though this would meet with resistance in the West. There is a large movement for socialism in the South; work is being carried out to create a national front. One-third of South Korean parliamentarians support the North. Many people, not just students, are now speaking out against the American presence.'"	Page 249 Footnote 21	1994	Secondary Vadim A. Medvedev <i>Raspad</i> (1994) p. 325	Russian	<p>Armstrong claims in <i>Tyranny</i> (viii) to have done all his own Russian translations "except where otherwise noted." But the similarity between this translation and Sergey Radchenko's earlier (and unacknowledged) translation of the same paragraph is too great to have been accidental. For clarity's sake the only different formulations in Radchenko's version have been bolded below:</p> <p>"The population of South Korea would support socialism, though this would meet with resistance in the West. There is a large movement for socialism in the South; work is being carried out to create a national front. A third of South Korean parliamentarians support the North. Not to mention students, many are now speaking out against the American presence."</p> <p>Radchenko had included this translation in a conference paper ("Building Bridges, Burning Bridges: Soviet Moves in Korea, 1988–1991"), with which Armstrong was familiar. (See the citation in Footnote 96, p. 273 of <i>Tyranny</i>.)</p>	https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B2Qjwug7juTITnVnZHpTZEVrZ0U/view?usp=sharing